Explicit and implicit issues in the developmental cognitive neuroscience of social inequality by Amedeo D'Angiulli et al.
HYPOTHESIS AND THEORY ARTICLE
published: 06 September 2012
doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2012.00254
Explicit and implicit issues in the developmental cognitive
neuroscience of social inequality
Amedeo D’Angiulli 1,2*, Sebastian J. Lipina3,4 and Alice Olesinska1
1 Department of Neuroscience, Carleton University, Ottawa, ON, Canada
2 The Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies, Carleton University, Ottawa, ON, Canada
3 Unidad de Neurobiología Aplicada (UNA, CEMIC-CONICET), Argentina
4 Centro de Investigaciones Psicopedagógicas Aplicadas (CIPA-UNSAM), Argentina
Edited by:
Brad Sheese, Illinois Wesleyan
University, USA
Reviewed by:
Silvia Benavides-Varela, Fondazione
Ospedale San Camillo, Italy
William J. Schneider, Illinois State
University, USA
*Correspondence:
Amedeo D’Angiulli, Department of
Neuroscience and Institute of
Interdisciplinary Studies, Carleton
University, 1125 Colonel By Drive,
Room 1316 Dunton Tower, Ottawa,
ON K1S 5B6, Canada.
e-mail: amedeo@connect.
carleton.ca
The appearance of developmental cognitive neuroscience (DCN) in the socioeconomic
status (SES) research arena is hugely transformative, but challenging. We review
challenges rooted in the implicit and explicit assumptions informing this newborn field. We
provide balanced theoretical alternatives on how hypothesized psychological processes
map onto the brain (e.g., problem of localization) and how experimental phenomena
at multiple levels of analysis (e.g., behavior, cognition and the brain) could be related.
We therefore examine unclear issues regarding the existing perspectives on poverty
and their relationships with low SES, the evidence of low-SES adaptive functioning,
historical precedents of the “alternate pathways” (neuroplasticity) interpretation of
learning disabilities related to low-SES and the notion of deficit, issues of “normativity”
and validity in findings of neurocognitive differences between children from different SES,
and finally alternative interpretations of the complex relationship between IQ and SES.
Particularly, we examine the extent to which the available laboratory results may be
interpreted as showing that cognitive performance in low-SES children reflects cognitive
and behavioral deficits as a result of growing up in specific environmental or cultural
contexts, and how the experimental findings should be interpreted for the design of
different types of interventions—particularly those related to educational practices—or
translated to the public—especially the media. Although a cautionary tone permeates
many studies, still, a potential deficit attribution—i.e., low-SES is associated with cognitive
and behavioral developmental deficits—seems almost an inevitable implicit issue with
ethical implications. Finally, we sketch the agenda for an ecological DCN, suggesting
recommendations to advance the field, specifically, to minimize equivocal divulgation and
maximize ethically responsible translation.
Keywords: EEG, ERPs, fMRI, neurocognitive processes, neuroimaging, socioeconomic status, theoretical
neuroscience
INTRODUCTION
In the domain of developmental cognitive neuroscience (DCN),
the study of poverty and social gradients is a very young area
of research where a core consensus is quickly emerging from
basic results. However, as any emerging scientific discipline, the
approaches used are influenced by epistemological stances inher-
ited from other disciplines, and potentially implicit beliefs sys-
tems. Explicitly or inadvertently, such influences can lead this
critically important new area of research to methodological and
ethical foundational challenges. For example, some of the issues
in need of debate are: conceptual and operational definition
criteria of socioeconomic status (SES) and poverty, scarcity of
specificity on how children experience different types of depri-
vation in different settings, and scarcity of critical cross-cultural
considerations regarding social exclusion mechanisms. Debate
on these and other issues involves the building of consensus on
interventions aiming at attenuating the effects of socioeconomic
disadvantage on children’s development. Without a critical anal-
ysis of the emerging issues, scientists may dangerously risk the
tendency to simplify the complexity that characterizes both phe-
nomena of development and social inequality. The aim of the
present paper is to contribute to a debate on the implicit and
explicit conceptual and methodological assumptions underlying
the current neurocognitive research on social inequality.
Some of the difficulties of studying SES stems from its inher-
ent spanning over many different areas of expertise, which implies
the need to establish interdisciplinary efforts. However, often the
integration of information occurs only after the building of sub-
stantial databases. Particularly, in the context of the study of SES,
that database is growing rapidly and there is an urgency to view
the complexity of the problems in question from as many levels
as possible. As proposed by several researchers in this field (e.g.,
Anderson, 1999; Bornstein and Bradley, 2003), the principles of
convergent and reciprocal causation help to explain how differ-
ent levels of analysis (i.e., molecules, cells, systems, individual
and social behavior), may contain different patterns of interact-
ing risk and protective factors. For instance, a risk factor present
in a context of development—e.g., a rearing environment without
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enough stimulation for cognitive competences—may not be suffi-
cient to cause a perturbation in the typical course of development,
but the interaction between such an environment and maternal
depression may indeed have that impact (for reviews and discus-
sions of examples of these instances of cumulative/comorbidity
effects, see Bradley and Corwyn, 2002; Hackman et al., 2010).
Another goal of this paper is to review the basis of the deficit
assumption that is possible to identify in some approaches focus-
ing on SES from a neuroscientific perspective. Many researchers
working in this field explicitly mention that results—e.g., impact
of poverty on cognitive performance or pattern of neural
activation—do not imply any reference to a disorder or deficit.
However, the model of explanation underlying some strategies of
investigation does not go beyond similarity, by virtue of which
several difficulties that children show in schools or in labora-
tory assessments are related to particular neural network patterns
of activation that have been found in clinical populations and
patients. The latter may raise an implicit prejudice or misconcep-
tion any time it is applied to exclusively support research efforts
aimed at finding differences that reflect negative outcomes in
terms of disadvantages of one or more groups as compared to
a normative group taken as criterion (Boykin and Allen, 2002,
2004). Conversely, in some other instances, it may seem rea-
sonable that differences in patterns of neural processes between
small groups of children may be a sufficient condition to infer a
deficit-like condition, such as “developmental delay,” even though
there are no manifest differences in behaviors that define the
deficit or disorder. Such interpretation is generally grounded
on an assumption of underlying neurological immaturity. Yet,
there is strong evidence against the plausibility of this stance.
Neurological immaturity, particularly neoteny, has been long rec-
ognized as trademark of neural plasticity in the human species
(De Beer, 1930; Fuentes, 2009) and the association between
higher levels of cognitive abilities and delayed trajectories of cor-
tical development in the “late bloomers” confirm that immaturity
is not necessarily associated with negative outcomes (Shaw et al.,
2006). Approaches alternative to the deficit assumption propose
to consider the broad range of plastic cognitive processes, which
characterizes human population. From this perspective, differ-
ences do not always have to correspond to deficits, as shown in
intervention studies (Burger, 2010) and in alternative conceptu-
alizations of conditions such as attention deficit and hyperactivity
disorder (ADHD) (e.g., Jensen et al., 1997, 2006) and dyslexia
(Geschwind, 1982, 1984).
The present paper is primarily concerned with interpreting
lower performance in low-SES children, relative to their high-
SES counterparts, as an indication of underlying brain deficit.
Similarly, the paper is concerned with assigning low SES as a
direct, univariate cause of cognitive deficits. In addition, we exam-
ine critically the nature of the still vaguely formulated deficit that
generally is (explicitly or implicitly) assigned to individuals with
low SES. The latter issue is addressed as a question of normativ-
ity, according to which differences relative to a criterion deemed as
“normal” are interpreted as deficits. Wemainly focus on the devel-
opmental human neuroscience literature which relies on findings
of differences between compared groups. Our critical view of the
deficit attribution does not underestimate the possibility of real
deficit. We present a perspective according to which interventions
are the main tool to determine real underlying deficits, since sev-
eral intervention programs show that many of the lags in low-SES
children’s performance are neither irreversible nor inevitable.
STATE OF THE ART ANDWHY IT IS TIME FOR
EPISTEMOLOGICAL REFLECTION
Undoubtedly, cognitive scientists and neuroscientists would have
a tremendous desire to contribute to understand and “solve the
problem” of poverty with the powerful analytic tools that such
disciplines can afford. Then, it is natural and genuine to foster the
interest in accumulating a synthesis of the available knowledge, or
the “state of the art,” and translate this knowledge in action and
intervention efforts (Posner, 2009).
Examples of this genuine thrust are the recent reviews by
Hackman and Farah (2009), Hackman et al. (2010), Lipina and
Colombo (2009) and Raizada and Kishiyama (2010), establishing
consensus on the evidence base of the neurocognitive science of
social inequality. Based on studies by different researchers dur-
ing the last decade, these syntheses show how some experiences
related to low SES or poverty during childhood are associated
with behavioral performance in tasks hypothesized to be related
to different underlying neurocognitive systems. Specifically, most
studies use behavioral and neuroimaging methods to character-
ize SES disparities in specific neurocognitive paradigms. These
studies are interpreted as suggesting that SES is a predictor of dif-
ferences in neurocognitive performance, particularly of language
and executive functions, and that these differences are found in
neural processing even when behavioral performance levels are
similar.
These timely reviews raise important issues and highlight the
necessity of considering poverty and SES in cognitive neuro-
science research as a critical developmental priority towards a
scientific agenda that includes the following issues: neural plas-
ticity, sensitive periods, epigenetics, vulnerability and susceptibil-
ity, exposure to environmental toxins, nutrition, stress response,
impact of different forms of poverty on neurocognitive pro-
cessing, and influences of childhood poverty on neurocognitive
functioning during adult life (Hackman and Farah, 2009; Lipina
and Colombo, 2009; Gianaros andManuck, 2010; Hackman et al.,
2010; Raizada and Kishiyama, 2010). That is, finally SES is a
legitimate topic for serious neurocognitive scientific investigation
rather than being relegated to the role of control or confound
variable.
However, as in all areas of recent development it would be
now necessary to also begin the review of some important epis-
temological and ethical issues. For instance, some of the evidence
included in the mentioned reviews deserves to be explored apply-
ing alternative interpretations, and consequently contribute with
the enrichment and complexities of the neuroscientific agenda.
In particular, it is unclear the extent to which the available labora-
tory results may be interpreted as showing that low-SES related
experiences may be necessarily associated with cognitive and
behavioral disorders or deficits in any environmental and cul-
tural context; and how findings may be interpreted to inform
the design of different type of interventions—particularly those
related to educational practices.
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Although a cautionary tone permeates the mentioned reviews,
still, a potential deficit attribution—i.e., the notion that poverty or
low-SES is associated with cognitive and behavioral developmen-
tal deficits—seems almost an inevitable implicit issue (Boykin
and Allen, 2002, 2004), particularly when media and scientific
divulgators approach the theme even after talking with their
authors (e.g., Sanders, 2008).
Despite the preliminary description of cognitive processing in
terms of basic operations—which represent a scientific advance
withmultiple scientific and policy implications—as it could prob-
ably said by most current literature in the field, these reviews do
not distance enough from a recent relative of psychometric tra-
dition that has systematically found confirmation of intellectual
and cognitive delay as part of the typical profile of disadvantaged
children (e.g., Jensen, 1968). Like forty years ago, the accumu-
lation of evidence for negative outcomes can be perceived as
overwhelming, so much so that it might be recognized almost
as the same “syndrome of poverty” representation (Lewis, 1967)
systematically resurfaced to the arenas of social, behavioral and
psychological disciplines for four decades since. Indeed, the cur-
rent themes of discussion concerning research and intervention
resemble strikingly those historical precedents and context when
social disadvantage in children was explicitly linked with deficits
from cultural deprivation (e.g., Hunt, 1968; see also Deutsch
et al., 1968). At this point, then, epistemological, conceptual and
methodological reflection is timely in order to better understand
the implications of low cognitive performance in today’s children
everyday life and any type of intervention effort, even those con-
ducted in laboratory contexts, and the groups of children and
families that are targeted. In the following sections, we explore
the nature of the evidence of SES disadvantages in current DCN,
starting from the conceptualization of poverty and SES used in
neuroscientific studies.
ISSUES ABOUT THE DEFINITION OF POVERTY
Social stratification notions such as “class,” and the different ver-
sions of “poverty” are classic constructs for sociology, economy,
psychiatry, and several other disciplines that participate in ana-
lyzing poverty phenomena. Nevertheless, there is no unique and
definitive definition of general poverty, particularly, of child-
hood poverty (Minujin et al., 2006). It is also important to
point out that there is an ongoing debate on the inconsistency
with which SES is being measured in studies across the devel-
opmental sciences. Some studies have used questionnaires (e.g.,
Hollingshead’s four factor index of social status), others inferred
SES through the parents’ educational level, the number of TV
or computers at home, and others inquired about the income
of the family directly. Furthermore, some studies relied on a
single key proxy, such as a measure of family income, while oth-
ers have used composite variables or multivariate approaches
with inclusion of indicators ranging from few (e.g., five) to a
large number (e.g., 25). At present, it is not clear exactly the
extent to which the definitions and measures of SES are compa-
rable, if they capture the same underlying factors and whether
the results that are obtained with such definitions and measures
can be legitimately synthesized under the same unitary inter-
pretation (Duncan and Magnuson, 2012). In this section, we
will selectively review just some of the inconsistencies as they
apply specifically to DCN studies (for more detailed discussions
see Bradley and Corwyn, 2002; Minujin et al., 2006; Bornstein
and Bradley, 2003). For our scope, we will use low SES as syn-
onymous of “relative poverty,” however, we will use poverty in
the instances where we want to refer specifically to “absolute
poverty.”
One of the most common approaches uses the specific level
of income of a family to define a child’s individual SES. There
are inherent problems with this approach, because it views the
effects of SES from a monetary standpoint and ignores the cofac-
tors, which sometimes are better predictors of the graded effect of
low SES. For example, prenatal factors such as the maternal men-
tal health have an enormous impact on the cognitive development
of a child, and cannot be reflected in the annual income of a fam-
ily (Surkan et al., 2011). This approach also does not consider the
composition of households in terms of gender and ages, which
could adversely affect the consideration of women and children
needs. For instance, it does not take into account that children
havemuch different needs than an adult, and that the goods of the
household might not be split evenly among its members (Minujin
et al., 2006). More importantly, many of the things that are cru-
cial for children healthy development are unrelated to purchasing
power, and are not based on income criteria. A poverty-stricken
family might still have access to clean air and water or other
freely available resources. However, most poor families in many
countries live in areas with toxins in their proximal environ-
ment, which have been proven to have a deep-rooted impact
on human well-being since prenatal stages (Hubbs-Tait et al.,
2005). For example, prolonged exposure to nitrogen dioxide—a
common traffic air pollution- has been associated with reduced
performance in tasks demanding working memory, motor func-
tion and coordination (Freire et al., 2010). Furthermore, severe
exposure to air pollutants in urban environments (i.e., fine par-
ticulate matter <2.5µm in diameter, PM2.5) has been linked
with children’s cognitive impairments (Calderón-Garcidueñas et
al., 2011a), white matter neuropathology (Calderón-Garcidueñas
et al., 2012a,b), brain stem and auditory processing pathology
(Calderón-Garcidueñas et al., 2011b) and neuroinflammation
(Calderón-Garcidueñas et al., 2012a,b).
This widely used definition of poverty is being challenged by
other multifactorial approaches such as the one informed by the
universal principles of human rights (Barbarin, 2003; Roosa et al.,
2005; Minujin et al., 2006). Human rights-based approaches usu-
ally include quantitative and qualitative indicators of access to
education, health and work market, among others, and could
offer a more consistent way to define poverty (UNPD, 2010). The
income approach is an indirect measure of SES because it uses
parental income and household wealth to measure the individ-
ual status of each child. The human rights-based approach can be
applied to each child and family separately, and is a more accurate
portrayal of their conditions, by being more sensitive to individ-
ual factors. This approach has also the potential to contribute to
the discussions regarding the deficit assumptions in the context of
the scientific community (see above), because it proposes to think
about deprivations in terms of a continuum with several possi-
ble outcomes. Furthermore, in an ethical context of discussion
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considering poverty in terms of human rights requires to review
critically the constructs of deficits, disability and potentialities.
However, even such an approach must be modified to accom-
modate for the different needs of children at different stages in
cognitive development (Lipina et al., 2011). There is a gradient
of effect according to several crucial factors such as: which risks
the child was exposed to, the length of the exposure, and the
child’s developmental period (Evans, 2003; Gassman-Pines and
Yoshikawa, 2006; Hall et al., 2010). Consequently, the definition of
poverty should reflect graded effects of social inequality in inter-
action with developmental time-course of the child, instead of
following the Extreme Group Approach (EGA; Preacher et al.,
2005) in which the SES gradient is cut off generally on two halves
fixed in time: poor or low-SES groups versus middle-high SES
groups. It is known that EGA reduces reliability by exaggerating
the differences between the groups and the individuals thereby
represented.
ISSUES ABOUT VALIDITY, DEFICIT ATTRIBUTION, AND
ASSIGNATION OF GROUP NORMATIVITY
As we have already mentioned, for decades, cognitive differences
between poor and non-poor or low and high SES developmen-
tal samples have been reported in psychometric and educational
tests, such as those measuring IQ and Developmental Quotients
(e.g., Bayley, CAT-CLAMS), arithmetic and language perfor-
mances (Duncan and Brooks-Gunn, 1997;McLoyd, 1998; Bradley
and Corwyn, 2002). However, historically, the interpretation of
IQ differences and what they really mean is still debated (Ceci,
1996; Nisbett, 2009; Stanovich, 2009). The main line of criticism
is that, if interpreted as a pure measure of intelligence, as in the
classic psychometric tradition, IQ tests may be biased against cer-
tain groups, which predominantly include children at the lower
end of the SES spectrum.
In his review of the WISC-R—one of the most widely used
IQ tests in children—Sattler (1992), proposed that most of the
evidence shows that mean WISC-R scores differences between
groups often confound SES and cultural backgrounds. That is,
minority children may not be culturally prepared to take IQ tests,
because they may not appreciate the demands, achievement stim-
uli, time pressures, competitive edge required, and may not see
the test in the same way. Furthermore, he observed that although
most IQ tests correlate with performance on educational achieve-
ment tests and, therefore, as concluded by Neisser et al. (1996;
p. 93) may be said to have no “predictive bias,” achievement tests
are known to be unfair to certain groups in which low SES and
minority status is overrepresented. Thus, the correlation between
educational achievement and IQ scores could be interpreted not
in terms of predictive validity but rather as a confirmation of
another sense of test bias, by some called “outcome bias” (Neisser
et al., 1996; p. 93) by others related to “cultural bias” in the con-
struction and administration of the tests (Suzuki and Valencia,
1997; Suzuki and Aronson, 2005) and yet by others differentiated
as “fairness” (Helms, 2006).
In addition, a different but related line of behavioral research,
has demonstrated that minority groups are especially vulnerable
to the effects of social status stereotype threats during IQ testing
(Steele and Aronson, 1995; Steele, 1997). Very recently, Kishida
et al. (2012) confirmed that the modulation of IQ performance
resulting from framing the test-taker’s environment with explicit
or implicit cues about the test-taker’s stereotyped social status is
correlated with changes of the BOLD (blood oxygenation level-
dependent) responses in amygdala and dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex.
If IQ testing reflects the modalities, tasks or abilities contin-
gent with the assessment situation, it follows that the differences
between low- and high-SES children on some IQ subtests do not
necessarily or predominantly reflect differences in the assumed
complex neurocognitive operations. Other types of neurocogni-
tive processing could be involved when “background” motiva-
tional, social or noisy circumstances appear during an assessment.
Thus, although not all the performance differences are biased in
the same way (especially those that control for some of these con-
founders), it is not known the extent to which the underlying
cognitive processes are more important than motivational, emo-
tional or social ones during the assessment situation to perform
well on IQ tests.
Another criticism is that low SES children may have lower IQ
scores because the tests do not adequately capture how those chil-
dren really function in everyday settings. Elkind (1973) suggested
two possible accounts as alternatives to the attribution of deficit.
One account may be that children from low-SES may develop
more quickly than their high-SES counterpart to anchor all their
experiences around problems or tasks that involve practical rea-
soning, albeit very complex (premature structuring). The other
account may be that low-SES children may get to the same point
as the high-SES children get, in their mental growth, but they may
get there using different functional pathways (alternate elabora-
tion). Hence, interpretation of the effects of low-SES or poverty as
a form of intellectual deprivation or lack of cognitive stimulation
should be qualified more precisely. Elkind suggested that intellec-
tual deprivation in poor children could refer to the kind and not
to quantity of stimulation. What poor children may be deprived
of is the same kind of stimulation expected in middle- or high-
SES children, the one that will prepare them to do well in tests
and school achievements (Elkind, 1973; p. 73). On the constraint
of a majority or mainstream group, our culture does value some
skills over others, and the IQ tests can be considered an accurate
predictor of a person’s ability to succeed in the abilities most val-
ued by such a culture (favoring middle- and high-SES, Nisbett,
2009). Because IQ tests are at least in part culturally biased, being
a reflection of the dominant culture’s values, the most appropriate
interpretation seems that likely they are measures of normativity
in our population (Vonèche, 2006).
The indeterminacies just outlined put into question that IQ
differences can be used as reliable indicators of SES neurocogni-
tive differences, if the normativity issues are not considered in the
interpretation of the results.
ISSUES ABOUT DEFICIT ATTRIBUTION AND LEARNING SKILLS:
AN OPPORTUNITY FOR DCN
Careful manipulation of classroom setting and teaching strate-
gies have shown that low-SES children might not be lacking the
IQ to perform accurately: approaches to learning are teachable
skills that may serve to lessen the gap between advantaged and
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disadvantaged children in the classroom. These skills are mal-
leable, and therefore susceptible to interventions, and generalized
to other areas of children’s life (Domínguez et al., 2011). When
controlling for stable traits such as intelligence, it has been found
that learning processes account for most of the variability of
academic success in the classroom (Schaefer and McDermott,
1999). This suggests that in some circumstances, one of the main
difficulties of low-SES children could be the fit between their
approach to learning and the typical classroom setting.
For instance, to bring the above argument closer to the neu-
roscience realm, some older conditioning studies (e.g., Bresnahan
et al., 1969) have confirmed that low-SES children do not tend to
employ the “win-stay, lose-shift” method of learning -the strategy
of keeping a hypothesis if it is proven right, and discarding it for a
new one if it is proven wrong. Low-SES children tend to preserve
a hypothesis based on even partially reinforced behavior, and do
not adjust their behavior when proven “wrong”. This failure to
adapt to the “win-stay, lose-shift” strategy could be the result of
overlearning. The number of confirmations after the child has
learned the hypothesis makes it more difficult to shift hypothesis
after partial reinforcement is introduced (Bresnahan and Shapiro,
1972). Alternatively, the reason because low-SES children tend to
preserve their hypothesis may be due to their inconsistent rein-
forcement histories, and even if low-SES children’s hypothesis is
not reinforced 100% of the time, it may be reinforced more than
what they are used to (Bresnahan and Shapiro, 1972). In their
pivotal study, Bresnahan and Blum (1971) exposed high- and
low-SES children to 0, 6, or 12 random reinforcements prior to
the beginning of hypothesis formation. At 6 random reinforce-
ments, high-SES children were making almost as many errors
as low-SES children. At reinforcement number 12, the high-SES
sample performed just as badly as the low-SES sample. This sug-
gests the devastating effect of chaotic reinforcement on children
ability to shift and form hypothesis, and may offer a possible
explanation regarding why low-SES children have difficulties in
this area. Overlearning may also contribute to the gradient of
SES effect on cognitive development, since the longer a low-SES
child spends in a chaotic environment, the harder it is to adapt
the structured academic world (Maxwell, 2010). Both groups of
children employ cognitive strategies, but low-SES children would
be more predictable. They seem to base their responses on the
previous reinforcement, rather than attempting to figure out the
odds (Silverman and Shapiro, 1970). However, it has been shown
that when the more complex shifting reinforcement strategies are
rewarded, then all subjects—whether low- or high-SES—switch
to them (Bresnahan and Shapiro, 1972), and, in particular low-
SES children show a much faster extinction period than their
high-SES counterpart when rewards are eliminated.
This line of evidence is consistent with current research
approaches on cognitive flexibility (Lipina et al., 2005; Clearfield
and Niman, 2012) environmental chaos (Evans andWachs, 2010)
and adaptive executive attention (Mezzacappa, 2004; D’Angiulli
et al., 2008a,b). Recently, literacy and numeracy skills have begun
to be approached by DCN and Educational Neuroscience as well
(Blair and Razza, 2007; Battro et al., 2008; Lipina and Sigman,
2012), constituting a fertile field to reanalyze some of the men-
tioned hypothesis from a neuroscientific perspective. There are
now better opportunities to test the continuity between basic
skills or preferences of information processing, which sculpt
learning very early outside the schools (Blair, 2002), and the ways
in which rules are understood and manipulated later on, inside
and outside the schools, contributing to how children learn and
think in everyday life.
ISSUES ABOUT DEFICIT ATTRIBUTION, CROSS-CULTURAL
NEUROPSYCHOLOGY, AND THE INTEGRATION OF COGNITIVE
AND BRAIN ACTIVATION LEVELS OF ANALYSIS
A branch of neuropsychological research extending the classic
work of Luria (1976) has focused on establishing more direct
links between families SES as it is embedded in the sociocultural
context, especially in literate versus illiterate groups, and neu-
rocognitive functions. Using batteries of neuropsychological tests,
Ardila and colleagues (Roselli and Ardila, 2003; Ardila, 2005) have
built a knowledge base on the interactions between social envi-
ronment and the development of neurocognitive abilities during
the life-span (for a comprehensive overview see Uzzell et al.,
2007).
Nevertheless, behavioral measures do not fare any better since
they are indirect and too global to be reliably put in correspon-
dence with circumscribed focal brain deficits of the size picked
up by, for instance, magnetic resonance imaging (MRI). The link
between a focal lesion and the large dynamic networks could
possibly be empirically incommensurable (Logothetis, 2008) and
could only be proven by direct manipulation of the “black box”
(Farah, 1994), such as systematically and selectively impairing a
neural network to observe how the resulting focal brain damage
directly affects the intervening process. Thus, these correspon-
dences are at best suggestive and grossly approximate.
Confronted with the issues of indirect, inferred evidence,
several investigators have turned to different neuroimaging tech-
niques. One of these, the evoked-related potentials (ERPs), a
non-invasive, child-friendly and relatively inexpensive technique,
allows researchers to capitalize on the greater sensitivity of ERP
compared to behavioral measures, and exploring differences
between groups across different measurements of a same con-
struct (i.e., attention). For example, Stevens and colleagues (2009)
found amplitude differences between high- and low-SES chil-
dren to probes in an unattended channel, yet both groups had
equivalent comprehension and memory performance for story
presented in the attended auditory channel. Thus, these findings
may suggest that group differences in distractor suppression arise
from differences in attentional modulation at early stages of per-
ceptual processing (i.e., within 100ms of stimulus presentation),
confirming how ERP measures are able to detect differences (i.e.,
with millisecond accuracy) that may not be observable with the
usual behavioral measures used in most laboratories.
In another study by Kishyiama et al. (2009), high- and low-SES
groups were equated on standardized norms from neuropsy-
chological tests. The predictions and interpretations of these
findings were based on considerable evidence concerning two
specific attention-related processes (i.e., novelty and prefrontal-
dependent extrastriate responses, e.g., Barcelo et al., 2000; Yago
et al., 2004). Consistent with ERP measures of target detection,
they found no group differences in behavioral target (novelty)
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responses (which does not imply that behavioral differences
do not exist, as other studies have been verifying in the last
decades) but supported the hypothesis that group differences
would only be observed in prefrontal-related neural responses.
The latter results have been also interpreted as demonstrating that
observed differences in prefrontal-related ERP responses cannot
be attributed to task difficulty (see Hackman and Farah, 2009).
The most important contribution of these studies is the
demonstration of the importance of analyzing the influences of
SES on neurocognitive performance simultaneously according to
at least two level of analysis: (1) behavior, and (2) concomitant
neural activation. However, at the same time these types of ana-
lyzes illustrate some epistemological difficulties on what DCN
should incorporate in its agenda. Both studies seem to make dif-
ferent assumptions on the measured ERP waves that induce a sort
of confusion of the level of analysis of the explananda. It is possi-
ble that they confound the level of brain activation with the level
of functional organization of complex cognitive or mental events
(e.g., cognitive control). The latter cannot be operationalized
in well defined sets of single operations, or put in correspon-
dence with large regional changes of activation, which in turn are
characterized by large individual differences and are directionally
ubiquitous—can correlate with both positive or negative polari-
ties in ERPs (or activation and deactivation in fMRI and PET).
There is now a considerable literature demonstrating that no cur-
rently available single neuroimaging technique affords such a fine
resolution grain to directly portray how the flow of information
is organized for complex cognition. That is, showing where and
the extent the information is used does not elucidate how the
brain uses it for cognitive operations (Roland, 1993; Sartori and
Umilta, 2000; Servos, 2000; Logothetis, 2001, 2008; Faux, 2002;
Krekelberg et al., 2006).
In some neuroscientific reports, it seems that the role of the
analysis of behavior and functional organization may be con-
sidered as ubiquitous, whether low-SES children do or do not
perform similarly to middle or high class children, their brain
is almost expected not to be activated as efficiently as it should
(see D’Angiulli and Lipina, 2010; and Jensen, 2009 for examples
of such an assumption). But in the absence of morphological
abnormalities, departure from typical brain activity in low-SES
individuals can only be validated in relation to an external objec-
tive criterion of low performance. It would be interesting to
analyze to what extent these assumptions were or not inherited
from the behavioral studies on the effects of SES on behavior,
school achievement and IQ, which also have tended to hinge on
the effect of normativity. That is, low-SES samples differ from
typically developing children belonging to middle-class major-
ity group, therefore, this could be interpreted as a delay, an
impairment or just atypical. Another potential implication of this
suggested inheritance could be that in some neuroimaging studies
is considered as a plus-value point when children from disparate
SES backgrounds achieve the same levels of behavioral perfor-
mance. Despite the advantage of identifying apparently pure
neural measures indicating activation differences, such findings
do not necessarily imply that neural differences are deficits. In
other words, deficits cannot be presumed in samples of low-SES
individuals only based on brain differences (Elkind, 1973).
Another type of epistemological issue would be represented
by those studies that equate patterns of activation from different
types of populations, such as brain-injuried patients, with low-
SES children. For instance, in the Kishyiama et al.’s work (2009),
the background research (Barcelo et al., 2000; Yago et al., 2004)
supporting the brain wave and top-down mechanism considered
is based on very controlled but rather small studies with stroke
patients and adults. The comparison between stroke patients and
children from low-SES backgrounds would present some epis-
temological issues. First, it did not address how age modulates
the associations between SES, behavioral performance, and brain
activation. Second, the use of lesion models or references would
induce the assumption that dissociation techniques prove local-
ization. However, behavioral changes from damage to a certain
part of the brain, does not indicate sufficiency. That is, consistent
with pluripotentiality (Luria, 1964, 1966) and neural reuse prin-
ciples (Anderson, 2010), the affected areas of the brain could be
contributing crucial information, but the changed function may
not necessarily be all or even partially represented in that area,
but in a chain of complex temporal and spatial networks dynam-
ics. Another example of this argument would be the Noble and
colleagues finding that the Left Perisylvian/Language System is
shown to have a significant correlation to SES variation (Noble
et al., 2006), if by over-interpreting we could forget that the “Left
Perisylvian/Language System” was proposed by the authors as a
broad operational construct, that correlation could be also put
in direct correspondence with differences in focal brain func-
tions in left hemisphere structures specialized for language, such
as Broca’s area (Raizada et al., 2008). However, although speech
functions are assumed to correspond to a decidedly contained
region, a large variability in lesion patterns and speech distur-
bances have been observed (Hojo et al., 1984) and Broca’s area
has been implicated in functions other than speech, such as
tool use (Higuchi et al., 2009). Furthermore, the developmen-
tal validity of hypothesized neurocognitive systems such as the
Left Perisylvian/Language System really comes from few non-
longitudinal studies with results from variable samples, implying
that behavioral evidence of neurocognitive differences between
SES groups, especially in preschool children, are still tentative at
this point.
There is also the issue of a certain circular logic in defining
cognitive processes. The research would induce these processes
from task-dependent behavior, but the formation of these tasks
require prior knowledge of the sought after process. This pre-
vious inferred knowledge can taint the experiment and produce
results that seem valid, only because they could validate the
researcher’s expectations in the first place. Such circularity can
be particularly problematic for research on SES. For example, in
the Stevens and colleagues study (2009), the described cognitive
performance is related to a very complex semantic comprehen-
sion listening task, which engages various components of working
memory, yet the positive wave differential effects which much of
their analysis focuses on is interpreted as mostly reflecting early
attentional processes. Consequently, it would be important to be
cautious before confirming the involvement of only one type of
cognitive process, in order to contribute with a reliable epistemo-
logical validation of psychological constructs—especially when
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SES issues are involved for the implications of equally valid alter-
native conclusions. Finally, some methodological decisions could
highlight the negative aspects of different cognitive processes
when applying rigorous exclusion criteria that results in samples
with disparate health or performance conditions (Hackman et al.,
2010).
INTERVENTION EFFORTS AND DEFICIT ATTRIBUTION BIASES
Although middle- and high-SES children also could experience
socioemotional and behavioral/cognitive issues related to atypical
development (e.g., Luthar, 2003, 2006; Luthar and Latendresse,
2005; Ansary and Luthar, 2009) they are not frequently and
promptly seen as eligible for interventions, if not within the realm
of universal public health and education. However, low-SES chil-
dren are mostly seen as eligible for many types of interventions
worldwide. By far this protective attitude is absolutely neces-
sary and warranted, because the social inequities produced by
each society systematically violate children basic rights, gradually
eroding their developmental opportunities, to the point of being
stigmatized and excluded from society (UNICEF, 2005). However
scientists need to take responsible decisions regarding the eligibil-
ity to intervention, by considering that interventions, especially
in the area of DCN, involve several issues that require the inclu-
sion of children from all socioeconomic backgrounds (Jolles and
Crone, 2012).
Lack of awareness of the potential biases associated with
the deficit attribution and normativity conformism can sup-
port practices that perpetuate inequalities and potential neglects.
Experimental interventions targeting neurocognitive functions
could be speculative if simply arise from proposals based
on unfocused evidence of correspondence with brain func-
tions. Rather, it would be important to identify potential
contributions of experimental interventions aimed at opti-
mizing cognitive, emotional and learning processes of low-
SES populations to foster inclusion in their community and
institutions.
At present, the available evidence about the cognitive gains
after training in laboratory contexts [e.g., Rueda et al., 2005
(attentional training/healthy children); Wilson et al., 2006,
2009 (arithmetic training/dyscalculic children); McCandliss
et al., 2003; Temple et al., 2003; Shaywitz et al., 2004
(attention and phonological awareness/dyslexic children)], or
school/community intervention programs aimed at optimiz-
ing cognitive development (e.g., Perry Preschool, Abecederian,
Chicago CLS, Tools of the Mind, Harlem Children’s Zone, etc),
suggest that neurocognitive plasticity, even considering the cur-
rent limitations in knowledge and specificity, could be modulated
through multimodular complex interventions which include
sociocultural contextual variables. Therefore, any statement that
implies the idea of a low performance-physiology associated with
a lesion process is not necessarily correct. Both can be circum-
stantial and more studies and new methodologies are needed to
better understand several related issues. In this sense, DCNwould
benefit from multimodular programs that have been shown to be
effective in improving low-SES children social inclusion, such as
Tools of the Mind (Bodrova and Leong, 2001), Harlem Children
Zone (Raver et al., 2008; Tough, 2008).
MEDIA IMPLICATIONS OF DEFICIT ATTRIBUTION AND
NORMATIVE BIASES
Media divulgation of DCN studies on childhood poverty could
also disseminate the deficit attribution and normativity assump-
tions to the public. The latter, in turn, can induce the generation
ofmyths—as commonly held, but erroneous beliefs—about brain
development and the influences of environment and parenting.
Once consolidated, the myths require much effort to be erad-
icated, often requiring the involvement of many professionals,
including the neuroscientists (Bruer, 1997). Among the reasons
that facilitate this type of undesirable effects, is the lack of discus-
sions among scientists on how to inform media about research
findings, although some important efforts have been made in the
last years (see Thompson and Nelson, 2001; Illes et al., 2010).
An example of such a dangerous dissemination is an article
by Sanders (2008) appeared under several online press subsidiary
outlets with associated links and citations which currently still
give thousands of hits in Google. While reporting about the
study by Kishyiama et al. (2009), the journalist first mentions
the following comment by one of the authors: “Kids from lower
socioeconomic levels show brain physiology patterns similar to
someone who actually had damage in the frontal lobe as an adult.”
The quote continues: “We found that kids are more likely to have
a low response if they have low SES, though not everyone who
is poor has low frontal lobe response.” Then, another author is
reported to have said, “These kids have no neural damage, no
prenatal exposure to drugs and alcohol, no neurobiological dam-
age. . . ” “Yet, the prefrontal cortex is not functioning as efficiently
as it should be. This difference may manifest itself in problem
solving and school performance. . . ” “Those from low socioeco-
nomic environments showed a lower response to the unexpected
novel stimuli in the prefrontal cortex that was similar . . . to the
response of people who have had a portion of their frontal lobe
destroyed by a stroke.”
To the extent that the alleged verbatim quotes could be trusted,
the reference to an association between deficit (prefrontal impair-
ment) and poverty seems clear. However, the results of one sin-
gle laboratory experiment—with small sample of children from
different SES and confounding mixed minority backgrounds—
cannot support definitive conclusions. It seems that the men-
tioned potential mistake in the distinction between different levels
of analysis (i.e., behavior, neural activation)—which deserves
to be an issue of discussion among scientists in the realm of
DCN—may have been omitted from the discussion. Thus, this
lack of clarity in the distinction potentially induces to mislead-
ing knowledge building and/or scientific divulgation about what
poverty really means in the life of children that suffer it and
the reversibility or not of the behavioral and neural activation
findings.
The same could be said regarding the scientific foundations of
interventions based on brain studies. For example, in the same
interview, another author is reported having said: “But changing
developmental outcomes might involve something as accessible
as helping parents to understand that it is important that kids sit
down to dinner with their parents, and that over the course of
that dinner it would be good for there to be a conversation and
people saying things to each other.” This statement includes many
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assumptions that should be discussed critically in the neuroscien-
tific agenda. First, those kinds of intervention statements probably
are true but could fit quite loosely the findings of the many inter-
vention studies that have been conducted in the last five decades,
rather than specifically in the emergent field of childhood poverty
and brain development. Second, as mentioned, there are many
environmental and cultural constraints that could put in question
the plausibility of what is suggested parents should do or be like,
since poor parents in many developing countries cannot chose to
freely engage in those actions (UNICEF, 2012).
To complete the circle, developmental cognitive neuroscien-
tists should also consider that they may not just be at the input
stage of the vicious cycle. They may be, like journalists and every-
one else in this media-dominated society, also at the receiving
end. It is striking that many of the implicit assumptions discussed
in this paper could be predicted by watching popular TV shows,
such as The Simpsons. Low-SES working class individuals are
often portrayed as unintelligent, hence having poor taste, as well
as lazy, and incompetent—especially as parents and providers—
and cognitively rigid, in political and religious senses (Alper and
Leistyna, 2005; Leistyna, 2009). Also, it would be hard to miss the
analogy with intervention in the many reality shows that focus
on improving the low-SES individuals through “makeovers” tar-
geting all the areas that portray the TV stereotypical social class
profiles (Leistyna, 2000; Miewald, 2001; Fink and Lomax, 2012).
It is only fair to ask whether any subtle influence creeps into our
science feeding back a predisposition to certain default assump-
tions in the way we approach the very object of investigation. One
thing is clear, if media as powerful as TV and online newspa-
pers may already have a background predisposition to consider
poverty and low-SES in a certain way, then neuroscientists should
be most careful with how to communicate and disseminate the
findings, interpretations and conclusions of their studies.
Excellent journalistic reporting of science does exist and is
becoming more common even in fields so politically and socially
charged as those dealing with poverty (see for example McIlroy,
2010). For effectively translating neuroscience to communities,
excellent journalism may very well turn a dangerous weapon into
a golden opportunity.
DEFICIT ATTRIBUTION, DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY
AND INTERVENTIONS
FROM DEFICIT ATTRIBUTION TO ADAPTATION
As mentioned, there is no question that low-SES children could
benefit from intervention programs aimed at optimizing their
developmental opportunities. However, many issues in the realm
of interventions should still been analyzed very carefully. For
example, it seems that the immediate gains of some interventions
go through a “fade out” process. That is, while the results show
clear gains within the first months after ending interventions
(higher IQs, particularly), successively, these benefits seem to fade
and disappear when the children are retested years later (Raizada
and Kishiyama, 2010). Interestingly, although IQ points seem to
revert back to baseline, children that attended intervention groups
seem to have acquired a sort of “grit”: a larger percentage of them
later in life are employed, graduate from secondary schools, end
up in stable and good employment, and have enough purchasing
power to afford dwellings and other personal properties (Knudsen
et al., 2006).
The pattern of “gains-losses-gains” has many different kinds of
implications. Regarding the neuroscientific agenda in the study of
childhood poverty, there is a need to design studies that will per-
mit to explore and analyze what kind of plasticity patterns could
explain such changes.
This area of research also implies the analysis of plastic pro-
cesses related to potential sensitive periods for many aspects of
emotional, cognitive, language and social development. From
another perspective, this pattern of gains and fading processes
also justifies the need to analyze what kind of intervention con-
tents in each module of a program is related with what type
of outcome. For example, are the intervention programs that
obtain these long-term desirable outcomes more oriented to self-
discipline or commitment to learning, or social values? In such a
case, any DCN agenda focusing on SES not only should include
genuine interactions with disciplines which feature preeminently
in the now so-called learning sciences (such as education, soci-
ology, and anthropology) but also disciplines that offer alterna-
tive frameworks of explanation (for example, population genet-
ics, ecology, and evolutionary biology). Furthermore, as Jolles
and Crone (2012) have highlighted, many confounding factors
should be considered when interpreting training effects, mostly
falling in two categories: (1) general confound factors: familiar-
ity, expectancy effects, shared components between the context
of trained and transfer tasks, motivation, feedback and reward,
and cohort effects; (2) factors specific to neuroimaging: such as task
performance, task irrelevant processing, awareness of task, mor-
phological changes, “scanner” anxiety, and performance on the
scanner.
Many current intervention programs (see section
“Intervention efforts and deficit attribution biases”) con-
ceived within DCN have been designed to target preferential
neurocognitive functions involved in learning acquisition and
basic cognitive operations deemed to support literacy, numeracy
and social skills. These interventions were at first conceived for
the entire population of children, but most recently there has
been a shift to tailor interventions for low-SES children with the
rationale that their basic skill development could be optimized
(Lipina and Colombo, 2009). The priority has become preventing
developmental learning/achievement disabilities that have been
found to covary with or be outcomes of SES (e.g., Bradley and
Corwyn, 2002). The relationships that connect intervention
and SES via the concept of disabilities are instrumental to
have a concrete term of reference in place of the vague, fuzzy
“deficit-like” condition that looms behind the deficit attributions.
Hypothetically, we can assume that the deficit underlying under-
performance and non-normative brain responses in low-SES
children may, in a form or another, end up manifesting as a
developmental disability. Then, we could begin to address the
question of how deficit would be concretely defined, understood
and dealt with from a perspective that integrates DCN and allied
disciplines.
Indeed, the model of deficit that underlies ongoing debate
on the construct and status of developmental learning disabil-
ity in some disciplinary arenas, i.e., education, has shifted the
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focus increasingly to what resembles an “adaptionist” concep-
tion of human abilities and performance (Levine, 1992; Gardner,
1999; West, 1999; Sternberg, 2000; Kalbfleisch, 2004). According
to this focus, every neurocognitive preference has strengths and
weaknesses, depending on the conditions at hand (Blair, 2002;
Schibli and D’Angiulli, 2011), which fits the model of parallel
non-mutually exclusive continua that could go from dis-ability
to hyper-ability (giftedness) depending on the structured inter-
actions between specific experiences and environments in which
individuals grow, live and go to school (Maggi et al., 2004;
D’Angiulli et al., 2004a,b)—what decades ago Barker (1968)
grouped under the term “behavioral settings.” Nevertheless, the
spectrum of potentialities apparently is preserved in order to
effectively supply our population with a diverse repertoire of
adaptive possibilities (Geschwind, 1982, 1984; Gilger and Hynd,
2008). As examples, let us consider two of the most typical devel-
opmental disabilities that are increasingly consistent with the
adaptionist scenario (West, 1999): ADHD and dyslexia.
ADHD is characterized by inattentiveness, hyperactivity and
impulsivity (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). Like in
the considerations of low-SES, impairment of executive func-
tion is the most prominent account for ADHD symptoms. This
hypothesis, however, is criticized because, despite the substantial
database of behavioral and neurological tests on ADHD, there are
many contradicting findings (Willcutt et al., 2005). For example,
memory is one of the supposed deficits. However, this seems to be
context-dependent for working memory (Lawrence et al., 2002)
or non-existent for long-term memory (Kaplan et al., 1998).
Yet an alternative conceptualization (Jensen et al., 1997,
2006) conceives the features of ADHD as evolutionary advan-
tageous traits derived from behavioral settings in ancestral or
tribal hunter-gatherer societies where hypervigilance and hyper-
activity, divided attention, and attentional scanning of the sur-
rounding environment represent important parts of readiness to
flight/fight response, which would augment the likelihood of sur-
vival. However, the latter is a hypothesis that still needs empirical
confirmation.
One does not need champion evolutionary psychiatry, some
other research, for example, has converged on the overlap
between children who appear to be highly creative and children
diagnosed with ADHD. Recent tests have shown that people with
high levels of creativity often score low onmeasures of latent inhi-
bition (Carson et al., 2003). It has been argued that it is because
of lack of such type of inhibition that these individuals are able to
problem-solve so creatively. It seems that these individuals have
a genuinely different way to negotiate distinct competing sources
of information and how it is then used for higher cognitive activ-
ities such as thinking: environmental cues seem to overwhelm
the influence of internal elaboration, and produce vastly different
responses than in less creative people. Specifically, Abraham and
colleagues (2006) found that children with ADHD could over-
come constraints of recently shown examples and create unique
imagery. However, when asked to imagine an object from three
different shapes, they failed to produce a practical one. That abil-
ity to think freely without the influence of rules or constraints
is a fundamental characteristic of problem solving which has
well supported neurocognitive basis (Shallice and Cooper, 2011),
furthermore, several real-life case studies confirm it is associated
with excellence in business, science, art and innovation (West,
2003). Although the evidence suggests promising possibilities,
much empirical work is needed to flesh out the adaptionist per-
spective on creative reasoning and problem solving in individuals
with ADHD.
The second example, dyslexia, is characterized as a reading
learning disability. Generally, many children with dyslexia show
language acquisition delays; they have trouble retrieving words
from memory, mastering grammar, planning and organization.
Moreover, they frequently have low processing speed, time aware-
ness, focus and error detection (Pugh and McCardle, 2009).
One of the most influential accounts for the symptoms is the
phonological core account, according to which the difficulties
with reading and writing stem from impairment in segmenting
and discriminating patterns of phonemes (Stanovich and Siegel,
1994). Although such account considers individual differences,
it seems that would not easily accommodate some of the other
deficits found with dyslexia, such as poor finger coordination and
eye movement while reading (Wolff et al., 1990; Bucci et al., 2012)
and a very recently reported deficit in procedural learning which
would make imitating and learning routines exceedingly difficult
for children with dyslexia (Nicolson and Fawcett, 2000).
Geschwind (1982, 1984) and Geschwind and Galaburda
(1987) were the first to propose an adaptionist view of dyslexia—
and by virtue of the frequent comorbidity between the two,
indirectly of ADHD as well. They proposed that genetics and in
utero hormonal activity modified neurodevelopment and hemi-
spheric specialization such that a person could be born with a
brain wired to be at risk for dyslexia but at the same time with
superior nonverbal abilities. They and others have proposed that
the setting of the left hemisphere language areas to be prone to
language-based impairments could in fact affect the growth of
portions of the right hemisphere such that there might be an
overrepresentation of nonverbal giftedness in samples of dyslexic
individuals. Thus, on this view, gene-brain-environment interac-
tion yields neural strengths and weaknesses, which, depending on
the behavioral settings, can translate into socially defined talents
and disabilities. Indeed, there is growing evidence that dyslexic
individuals do seem to have selective, but very subtle and spe-
cific advantages for the span of visuo-spatial attention (Geiger and
Lettvin, 1987), speed in performing global evaluation of complex
visual stimuli (von Károlyi, 2001; Winner et al., 2001; von Karolyi
et al., 2003), and visual comparisons (Schneps et al., 2007).
Early studies of dyslexia supporting Geshwind andGalaburda’s
thesis suggested that deficits in reading originate from an alter-
nate neural circuit, which relies heavily on the right hemi-
sphere (e.g., Yeni-Komshian et al., 1975). This hypothesis has
since been modified and redefined as an interhemispheric con-
nectivity issue affecting primarily the angular gyrus, which is
hypothesized to be an important circuit linking visual asso-
ciation areas with language centers, especially, Wernicke’s area
(Horwitz et al., 1998). The lack of “short” interconnections in
the angular gyrus may be explained by the broad spacing found
in the minicolumns of dyslexic patients’ brains by Casanova and
colleagues (2002a). A slight change in the functional minicol-
umn structure would have widespread effects across the brain,
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impacting connectivity between areas of the brain, and, in doing
so, information-processing functions (Casanova, 2010; Casanova
et al., 2010). The alternative circuit in dyslexic patients may be
the result of a distinct shift in processing, which appears to be
most detrimental during phonological decoding (Simos et al.,
2000). Other structural differences found in brains of individuals
with dyslexia could be explained by a general change of minicol-
umn morphology. The brains of individuals with dyslexia show
decreased gyrification, and atypical lateralizatization (Rumsey
et al., 1997), as well as a wider gyral window (Casanova et al.,
2010). Structural processes such as lateralization and gyrification
may result from an addition of minicolomns within the isocor-
tex (Casanova and Tillquist, 2008), and a wider gyral window
allows for longer cortico-cortical fibers and spaced out mini-
columns (Casanova et al., 2010). Only future research efforts will
tell whether minicolumnar structure and organization are indeed
linked to cognitive functions and preferences (Casanova, 2010),
thereby, addressing some of the same limitations we have dis-
cussed in section “Issues about deficit attribution, cross-cultural
neuropsychology and the integration of cognitive and brain acti-
vation levels of analysis.”
Can the adaptionist explanatory framework be extended to
low-SES children? Consideration of such a possibility is scant but
does exist in the literature, with supporting behavioral evidence
(e.g., Buckner et al., 2009, 2003). Some neuroscientific support
comes from aforementioned ERP studies on executive and selec-
tive attention in children living in poverty-stricken and inner city
neighbourhoods. For instance, there is consistent accumulating
evidence that Low-SES children attend both to relevant and irrel-
evant information employing in the process more intense and
longer effortful control than high-SES counterparts (D’Angiulli
et al., 2008b; Stevens et al., 2009). We have argued that in the
behavioral settings in which these children live (chaotic, noisy,
and threatening) indiscriminate attention and monitoring of
environmental cues (“ear-to-the-ground”) may actually be adap-
tive for detecting dangerous or unwanted situations, to trigger
in a top-down fashion appropriate fight/flight responses (i.e.,
D’Angiulli et al., 2008a,b). However, similarly to the evolutionary
advantage of ADHD traits, the latter hypothesis also needs further
empirical confirmation.
DEFICIT ATTRIBUTION, DISABILITY AND SOME ETHICAL
CAVEATS OF INTERVENTIONS
The ability of our brains to adapt to a quickly and constantly
changing environment is one of the reasons why humans have
become a complex species with a high range of adaptability
(Bednarik, 2011). However, it is difficult to demonstrate the adap-
tive potential of many neural processes other than those involved
in literacy and numeracy because until very recently, the emphasis
has concentrated mostly on inter-group differences in those sub-
jects. We should ask whether the difficulties to filter information
normatively as shown by some low-SES children, for example,
could also coexist with high imagination competency or higher
spatial situational awareness and physical agility in their own
environments not picked up by mainstream research methods
(e.g., Nunes et al., 1993). The fact that laboratory tests may fail
to mimic some potentially key ecological dimensions of real-life
environments is just one confound that is not properly addressed
and that could be improved with approaches combining longi-
tudinal behavioral and neural activation measures in behavioral
settings.
We do not condemn intervention efforts, but rather suggest a
critical take on them, to integrate adequately and genuinely the
contribution of many scientific approaches that responsibly are
trying to improve ways to study childhood poverty, as per DCN
community. For instance, instead of seeking to only change the
child, the education system could benefit by adapting to accom-
modate for different neurocognitive preferences, such as DCN
studies on individual variability show. For example, a study by
Lawrence et al. (2002) on ADHD children in a natural environ-
ment showed that the deficit in working memory does not appear
while the children were playing video games. They suggested that
continuous feedback and reinforcement in the form of visual and
auditory cues, as well as the opportunity to self-pace, alleviated
the strain on working memory enough for the children to per-
form well. On the other hand, dyslexic children have an easier
time with explicit learning and having the explicit rules broken
down into manageable steps, instead of imitating a full routine.
This kind of information would be helpful for teachers with not
only dyslexic and hyperactive children, but also with all children
who have trouble with working memory or procedural learning,
including some low-SES children. This kind of approach can help
lessen social pressures on low-SES children in contexts such as
those inducing the pygmalion effect (Rosenthal and Jacobson,
1968).
The effect of a teacher’s bias on the performance of chil-
dren in the classroom has been known since many years ago
(e.g., de Boer et al., 2010) and although the original pygmalion
effect needs substantial revisions, the most recent reviews con-
firm that stigmatized groups such as African-Americans and
children from low-SES backgrounds still continue to be sensitive
to the expectations of their teachers, and do poorly when there
is an assumption of failure (McLoyd, 1998; Jussim and Harber,
2005) spending extraordinarily more energy negotiating for their
image in society than their middle- or high-class counterparts
(Stephens, 2010) with increased odds of learned hopelessness or
helplessness (Ursin and Eriksen, 2010).
Thus, it is important to consider and reflect about the respon-
sibilities of the scientific community to prevent harmful myths,
prejudices, misconceptions, and how some research may be, even
if unwillingly, contributing to them. If some of the assumptions
and attributions we consider here may not only be seen in the
case of low-SES children, being connected with the conceptual-
ization of developmental disabilities such as ADHD and dyslexia,
we could observe again a pattern where “difference” seems inter-
preted as “deficit.” Nevertheless, based on what we learn in the
comparison with these disabilities, the conditions associated with
low-SES could at some level be defended as having an adaptive
role even considering a deprived environment—which defini-
tively implies an unethical circumstance.
If interventions can be created which have an impact on under-
lying neural processes, the crucial questions still remain: do we
want to change the atypical neural preferences to normative ones?
And in such a case, as it may apply to low-SES children, what are
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the foundations of our intentions as scientists? Are we being care-
ful in not hastily putting the horse of intervention before the cart
of understanding? These and other poignant questions regard-
ing interpretation and translation of research results, as well as
their far reaching implications, overlap remarkably with the most
recent debate regarding ethical, legal and social issues in neu-
roethics (Illes et al., 2006). However, while the debate over the
clinical use of neuroimages is right now very much alive, a par-
allel debate on the neuroethics of intervention is overdue in the
DCN of SES.
LIMITATIONS OF THE ADAPTIONIST PERSPECTIVE
The adaptionist perspective is not immune to problems. Thus,
to rebalance our critical review, we need to consider a few of
its shortcomings here. One major issue is that very few research
efforts have consolidated the adaptionist evidence-base, and most
of the hypotheses need much more empirical testing and corrob-
oration (as we did note in previous sections). The adaptionist
perspective is based on an underlying assumption of complexity
that preserves a general determinism (for example, probabilistic
as in dynamic systems). However, cannot be mapped or decom-
posed easily into strict causality relationships (Bunge, 1979).
Therefore, it does not offer very transparent explanations that give
compelling accounts for indirect effects associated with low-SES
environments. For example, it is not clear how certain variables
associated to low SES such as inadequate nutrition can be incor-
porated in adaptionist models. Neurobiological and neurophys-
iological studies have shown that a poor diet during pregnancy
and/or during the infants’ first months of life can induce anatomic
and functional development problems in the brain (e.g., Morgane
et al., 1993, 2002; Georgieff, 2007). In some cases, low-SES par-
ticipants may be facing real brain deficits that later might have
irreversible consequences on their performance on cognitive tasks
(e.g., de Souza et al., 2011; Waber et al., 2011; Galler et al., 2012).
The same goes for the neurotoxic effects of theratogens and pollu-
tants (see section “Issues about the definition of poverty”). Which
aspects could be considered adaptive in these circumstances? If
adaptionism is not related to the ecology of the living condi-
tions (the behavioral settings) then the explanatory power of that
approach is quite limited.
Although there is no need to link adaptions to evolutionary
advantages, which by themselves have problems of falsifiability
and possible ideological confounds (e.g., the implicit assumptions
of positivistic progress, see Searle, 1995), it is difficult to empir-
ically validate what is or not adaptive in a given situation, and
decisions on what is or not adaptive may ultimately appear to be
nothing but arbitrary.
Related to the previous criticisms, one implication is that the
adaptionist perspective can be easily misinterpreted as a form of
extreme relativism minimizing real challenges that certain groups
are likely to encounter. This in turn may actually be harmful to
children who do have actual deficits and do actually need support.
In sum, adaptionism can be as speculative as the deficit
assumption. If misinterpreted or misused, it may be perceived as
or actually become a roadblock to advances in the field of inter-
vention. However, some aspects of the definition of adaptations
can be improved and falsifiable, we explore further these features
in the next section to propose a framework in which they can con-
structively enhance, not stonewall, the approach to interventions.
SOME POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
EXPERIMENTAL INTERVENTIONS AND REAL DEFICITS
If adaptionism is properly examined in ecological settings, the
idea of deficit can be redefined as a variable set of environmental
conditions experienced by low-SES participants which becomes
a detrimental factor in preventing optimal brain development,
possibly resulting in irreversible neurocognitive impairment. This
conceptualization does not underestimate the possibility of “real”
deficit; and permits to incorporate experimental interventions as
a way to measure deficit in a non-normative fashion. That is,
experimental interventions could be the main tool to determine
the extent of reversibility, and conversely, plasticity, since with
the appropriate intervention a low-SES or poor child’s perfor-
mance could catch up with that of the higher SES counterparts.
In this way, it would possible to identify real and essential deficits
as a miss or break down of adaptation. Accordingly, possible
neurocognitive deficits could be identified without sidestepping
ethical issues (since intervention may be offered to children from
all SES background as a preemptive form of support), and with-
out relying on value-laden normativity criteria. Conversely, such
approach would also permit to properly evaluate the extent of
deficit even in some instances of extreme early or chronic depri-
vation, for example some forms of malnutrition whose effects are
at least partially reversible with early intervention (e.g., Martorell
et al., 1994).
TOWARD AN ECOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTAL COGNITIVE
NEUROSCIENCE FRAMEWORK
Approaching the implications and issues that deficit attribution
and normativity have in the context of an interdisciplinary DCN
research agenda, focused on child development, biological and
social determinants, implies starting from a wide conceptualiza-
tion. Such framework should make provisions for multiple levels
of analysis, explanations in terms of interactive complex mech-
anisms situated in turn within a systemic, comprehensive, and
coherent approach incorporating ecological perspectives (e.g.,
Barker, 1968; Bronfenbrenner and Ceci, 1994). Thus, we pro-
pose that an ecological developmental cognitive neuroscience
(eDCN) framework would be necessary to promote a visualiza-
tion of child development, developmental processes and social
determinants thereof as complex phenomena. The construction
of a common language dealing with child development and
determinants (i.e., biological, social, and cultural) in ecological
terms would be a first, necessary step toward the construction
of academic networks apt at informing about both the design,
and implementation of comprehensive, coherent experimental
interventions.
Consistent with eDCN, ecological and transactional consider-
ations on child development and determinants should contribute
to build a research agenda with at least the following updated
issues:
(a) Identifying different problems and risk factors levels for
both basic and applied research. For example, considering
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ecological theories, the complex set of problems and risk
factors characterizing the biological, psychological and cul-
tural determinants of low-SES child development would offer
researchers a basis for organizing research agendas, with focus
on development as a complex phenomenon, being integrated
into different conceptual, methodological frameworks, and
being applicable within different, sociocultural contexts.
(b) Reconceptualizing measurement of child poverty. Conceptual
and operational definitions of poverty are unlikely to capture
either specific information on the deprivation children are
subjected to, or to associate deprivation with different devel-
opmental phases and dimensions. Specifically the level and
type of deprivation, as well as brain developmental stage at
the time of deprivation, may modulate the impacts. As men-
tioned, several studies have advised that children exposed to
poverty must be taken into account as independent analysis
units as they are exposed to poverty’s effects in a differ-
ent way than adults or other children (Gordon et al., 2003;
Roosa et al., 2005; Minujin et al., 2006). Although these
studies improve the comprehension of how poverty affects
child development, they still do not take into account the
interrelationship and interdependence between phases, con-
texts, and dimensions of development. At present, many
researchers agree that the multifactorial nature of poverty
means that multidimensional measurement methods have to
be adopted and adapted to child poverty. Such a demand
for multidimensional definitions and measurements imposes
an obligation to carefully select the measurement methods:
questions, hypotheses, and study objectives aimed at analyz-
ing child development processes in both research to identify,
describe, and research into intervention strategies.
(c) Guiding the design of interventions in terms of different systems
and dimensions involved in child development components and
processes—i.e., building an ecology of interventions through
data-driven theory. In particular, the current research agenda
in the DCN area suggests there is a need to analyze the
emergence of different self-regulatory, cognitive, and emo-
tional processes, their role in school learning process, their
modulation in function of parents’ mental health and home
stimulation as well as their potential optimization through
home, school, and community (Lipina and Colombo, 2009).
However, we propose that this should be done systemati-
cally within a common research framework to all researchers
and guided by a process of knowledge building through the
formulation and falsification of data-driven theories.
(d) Focus on promoting support for both basic and applied research
on child development as the main focus. Although financial
institutions and organizations—especially those in develop-
ing countries—usually consider child development issues to
be a high-priority area, there exists a lack of visualization
of the complexity of such mechanisms and determinants.
In addition, several types of academic inertias act in favor
of some approaches at the expense of others (e.g., either
Constructivism vs. Behaviorism in education-based research
or environmental vs. genetic determination of cognitive
competences throughout development). The latter, reduces
possibilities for genuine disciplinary integrations as well as
researchers’ formation in new areas such as neuroscience and
education. In this context, supporting efforts aimed at pro-
moting collaborations focused on different levels of analysis
would be important, such as: (1) modulation of parenting
dealing with the development of self-regulatory competences;
(2) analysis of the associations between teaching styles, and
the development of executive control competences; (3) iden-
tification of cultural constraints for nutritional supplemen-
tation interventions; (4) integration of cognitive, emotional,
and social competences stimulation when designing school
curricula; (5) inclusion of art in community interventions as
a tool for social and health transformations, such as for exam-
ple El Sistema in Venezuela; or The Children Harlem Zone
in New York (6) knowledge mobilization of intervention
approaches across the globe.
(e) Building capacity aimed at progressively eliminating myths,
prejudices, as well as conceptual dogmatisms. As mentioned,
the lack of visibility and vision for childhood is a frequent
problem in many countries worldwide that involves parents,
teachers, politicians, and policy-makers. Nevertheless, it is
possible to find an even more serious situation in academia.
This implies an urgent need to create new instances of forma-
tion at the local and global scales.
(f) Influencing public opinion, through the media, to promote col-
laboration between researchers and journalists, based on the
consideration of child development as a complex, systemic phe-
nomenon. Part of the researchers’ social responsibility lays
in disseminating knowledge—hence avoiding myths to be
created with regard to child development. Thus, setting up
common, ethical norms so that public opinion could be
informed through the media would be not only feasible but
also desirable. Furthermore, training efforts could be gener-
ated such as interdisciplinary workshops, and debates—and,
even, contents useful to university degree courses for Social
Communication and Journalism programs as well (see Illes
et al., 2010). Such efforts should also be integrated within
multiple modules of intervention designs, from an ecological,
transactional perspective, for example, as an integral compo-
nent of activities guided by the proposed eDCN framework.
CONCLUSIONS
By no means do we argue that cognitive and behavioral perfor-
mance differences between low- and high-SES children are mere
epiphenomena of contrived laboratory experiments or that such
differences play no part in determining children’s economic and
social outcomes in adulthood. Such differences have been well
documented across different cognitive domains, using a variety
of experimental designs and cognitive tasks. Thus, these empiri-
cal findings deserve utmost attention of developmental cognitive
neuroscientists, as they are suggestive of differences in struc-
tural and functional organization of the brain as a function of
the SES context in which it develops. In addition, the hypothe-
sis that observed differences are largely attributable to cognitive
deficits in low-SES children should be considered with great
caution, since it could ignore the fact that different SES con-
texts present unique environmental challenges to which children
must learn to adapt. Therefore, it seems more likely that at least
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some performance differences between low-and high-SES chil-
dren reflect differences in structural and functional organization
of the brain as a result of context-specific organism-environment
interactions which potentially confer different forms of adaptions
to their own environmental settings.
Taking this conceptualization seriously, it is possible to rec-
ognize that positive adaptions to one specific environment may
not be generalizable to other environments, and therefore may
not be congruent with them in terms of certain of their cogni-
tive, behavioral, and socio-emotional requirements. By extension,
using developmental norms of one context to assess cognitive,
behavioral and socio-emotional performance of children from
another context may reveal clear performance differences plausi-
ble to be interpreted as deficits. Such misinterpretation, however,
is relative to diverse contexts taken as normative and therefore
biased and wrong because it does not explain cognition and
behavior in ecologically valid terms.
There is a variety of deprived circumstances characterized by
specific ecological risk factors present inmoderate and severe low-
SES settings (e.g., Gordon et al., 2003) which predispose children
to particular types of developmental insults, with potentially irre-
versible neurological consequences. A number of such risk factors
have already been documented, including malnutrition, exposure
to environmental toxins and severe physical and psychological
abuse (Bradley and Corwyn, 2002; Lipina and Colombo, 2009).
However, research in this area has exclusively focused on low-SES
environments, despite the recent evidence that high-SES contexts
may too predispose children to certain negative cognitive, behav-
ioral and socio-emotional impacts, perhaps different in kind, but
no less developmentally important (Luthar and Ansary, 2005;
Luthar, 2006; Ansary and Luthar, 2009). Therefore, both negative
and positive ecological factors should be considered at all levels of
the SES spectrum.
Furthermore, it is not the purpose of the paper to discourage
any type of effort to develop and implement intervention
programs aimed at optimizing both cognitive and socio-
emotional development of children from low-SES backgrounds.
Any improvements in academic performance, reduction in
grade repeating and/or school failure are considerable steps for-
ward in influencing both social and economic outcomes of
children who grow up in circumstances which do not read-
ily afford them sufficiently appropriate developmental oppor-
tunities. In addition, it is clear that such programs can
be rich sources of empirical data concerning the mediating
effects of cognitive and behavioral training on the structure
and functioning of the brain, constituting from the eDCN
perspective, valuable information on experience-dependent
neuroplasticity.
Finally, we are optimistic about the role that cognitive neuro-
science can play in the solution of the problem of the relationship
between brain development and SES disparities. Ultimately, such
a solution must include an explanation of how different social
and economic conditions in which children grow up differentially
influence the growth and development of neural mechanisms,
and how such differences translate into adult neurocognitive
outcomes. At a more practical level, cognitive neuroscience in
collaboration with other disciplines can greatly contribute to the
design of practical methods to deal with various developmental
issues associated with different SES contexts. Both, the field’s cur-
rent and future technological and methodological advances are
promising in addressing these questions. But probably those alone
will not be enough. Substantial advances need to occur most and
foremost at the level of theoretical conceptualization and under-
lying epistemology. The analysis and proposals reviewed heremay
contribute to a debate steering the field a step forward in the right
direction.
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